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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
DISCONNECTION OF CERTAIN
TERRITORY FROM HIGHLAND
TOWN.

Case No.
18191

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF TEE NATURE OF THE CASE
At the trial in the District Court, Highland Town,
now known as Highland City, because of the nature of the
proceeding, was referred to as Respondent, rather than Defendant.

Inasmuch as Highland City is the party appealing

the case to this Court, however, all future references to
it in this Brief will be to Appellant.

This will prevent

confusion with the Petitioners below who hereafter will be
designated as Respondents.
This was a proceeding in which Respondents, herein,
sought to disconnect approximately 131 acres of territory
from the limits of what was then known as Highland Town,
but which has since become a third class city.

Highland

City, acting through its Mayor and City Council opposed
the petition of Respondents and the case proceeded to trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried on February 11 and February 29,
1
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1980, before the Honorable George E. Ballif, sitting without a
jury.

Evidence was presented by both sides.

At the conclusion

of the evidentiary phase of the trial it was determined that
memoranda would be prepared and oral arguments made after the
transcript of the evidence became available.

Accordingly,

the memoranda were filed and the case argued to the Court on
August 22, 1980.

The Court then prepared a Decision which

was signed August 28, 1980.

The Court thereupon appointed

a Commission to conduct a public hearing pursuant to statute,
which was done on July 7, 1981.

The report of the Commission-

ers was filed with the Court and approved on October 23, 19810
The Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and an Order of Disconnection of Respondents' 131 acres of
land from Highland City on November 4, 1981.

Appellant filed

a timely Motion for a New Trial,. or in the alternative, to
amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of
Disconnection.

The court entered its order denying the motion

on December 10,

1981.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks an order remanding the case to the
District Court with instructions to consider all of the evidence
presented by Appellant and Intervenors, both during the trial
and in connection with its motion for a new trial, in determining whether or not to allow disconnection of the territory.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant will treat certain areas in greater detail
in the arguments that follow, but the essential facts of the
case are these:
Highland Town was incorporated in the summer of 1977.
It later became a third class city, known as Highland City.
While it varies in length and width, its dimensions can be
stated generally to be about three miles long from east to
west and from two to three miles wide from north to south.
It is located in the northernmost portion of Utah County,
between Alpine on the north and American Fork on the South.
The 131 acres in question are situated in the east and
northeast portions of the city.
While the Respondents include several different
individuals and business entities, most of the territory
in question is under the effective control or ownership of
Gibbons Realty Company.

It is anticipated by both Appellant

and Respondents that some portion of the area in question
will be used by Gibbons and Reed Co. for a gravel and sand
extraction process, even though no such activity has been
conducted there in the past.
Appellant believes, and its witnesses testified;
that the operation of such a process would seriously disrupt
the quality of life now enjoyed, not only by the residents
of Highland City, but by the residents of Alpine City, as
3
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well.
The

disr~ption

would result from increased noise,

and vibration; dirt and dust in the air and on the highways;
and danger from increased vehicle traffic.
In addition, Appellant presented evidence that a
large majority of Highland's residents opposed any industrial
development of this type within the city limits, preferring
that the city remain essentially a rural, residential community.
The city of Highland is zoned residential and agricultural only, with no commercial or industrial areas.
The territory in question has two state highways and
some erstwhile private roads, which are located in property
under lease from Utah Power and Light Co., with an option in
the city to purchase it.
Law enforcement is provided by Highland City through
a contract with the Utah County Sheriff's Department, and fire
protection is provided by Highland City through a contract with
Alpine City.
There are no publicly owned or operated water or
sewer services in the area, although the City hopes to locate
a water pressure tank there and to run water lines from it into
other portions of the city.
The City hopes sometime to build a cemetary or park,
or both in the area.
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant believes that the annexation of what is
known as the "Kjar property" after the evidence was in, but
before the Order of Disconnection was signed by the court,
constitutes an island or an unusually large or varied-shaped
land mass projecting into the boundaries of Highland City.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER AND
TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN ARRIVING AT ITS
DECISION, AND IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER OF
DISCONNECTION, ALL THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED
AT TRIAL BY APPELLANT'S AND INTERVENORS'
WITNESSES.
Two statutes dealing with the conduct of trials
relating to disc.onnection of territory from the boundaries
of cities and towns are controlling on the trial Court.
They are Sections 10-2-501 (3) and 10-2-503 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended.

The pertinent language of these

sections follows:
10-2-501 (3): ...• the question of disconnection
shall be tried before the district court in
the same manner as civil cases are tried. The
officers of the municipality, or any person
interested in the subject matter of the
petition may appear before the court and contest
the granting of the petition for disconnection
by presenting the evidence as they deem relevant.
(Emphasis added).
10-2-503: The Court for the purposes of determining whether or not territory should be disconnected shall consider whether or not disconnection will leave the municipality with a
residual area within its boundaries for which
the costs, requirements,

5
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or other burdens of municipal services
would materially increase over previous
years or for which it would become economically or practically unreasonable to
administer as a municipality. The court
shall consider among other factors the
effect of the disconnection on existing
or projected street, or public ways, water
mains and water services, sewer mains and
sewer services, law enforcement, zoning
and other municipal services and whether
or not the disconnection will result in
islands or unusually large or varied-shaped
peninsular masses within or projecting
into the boundaries of the municipality
from which the territory is to be disconnected.
(Emphasis added).
Pursuant to the authority granted by these statutes,
Appellant proceeded to produce evidence on a variety of irnportant questions.
Mayor Donald R. LeBaron testified that disconnection
of the territory would hamper Appellant in carrying out its
responsibility for the peace, health, and safety of its residents (T.76).

He gave his opinion as to the effect disconnect-

ion would have on water and air quality planning by Highland
City.

He testified as to the investments made by Highland's

homeowners to preserve their homes from "degradation and
anything else that might happen.

11

(T. 77, 78) .

Mayor LeBaron said the city was looking at the
possibility of developing the Utah Power and Light Company
property, which is part of the territory soughtto be disconnected,

into a recreational area and city cemetary

(T.182),

and that it would be much easier to control the area if it
6
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were to remain part of the city

(T.183).

He said that if

the territory were not disconnected, the city would run a
sewer line into it

(T.184).

Mayor LeBaron said the city

was considering locating a water tower on the Utah Power and
Light Company property under lease and option to the city,
and that it would probably attempt to locate a pipe to carry
water from the tower within about three years

(T.228).

He

testified as to the necessity of a holding pond on the territory in question

(T.229).

Were it not for the disconnection,

all of the line would be inside the city limits

(T.230).

City police protection would be provided to prevent vandalism
around the line

(T.231).

Dr. F. LaMond Tullis, a former city councilman,
testified that a Mr. Bagley of Gibbons and Reed Company had
told the town council that the company desired, at that time,
to construct and operate a gravel extraction plant, but that
later it might also decide to include a cement batch plant
and an asphalt batch plant.
cussed the matter.

The town counciltheceupon dis-

The council expressed a "similar theme

11

that the consensus was to have a low density residential
community

(T.130), and each member of the council then spoke

of his opposition to the industrialization of Highland.

(T.131).

Dr. Tullis told how public opinion surveys and small
neighborhood meetings were utilized to determine what kind of
a town the residents wanted.

Eighty percent of the households
7
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were canvassed
prepared.

(T.133, 134).

Ultimately, a final document was

(T.135).
Dr. Tullis testified that people had moved to Highland

because they were fleeing something they didn 1 t 1 ike in other
places, and they were attracted to Highland because of a certain quality of life and environment they found there.

They

wanted spacious living and a high quality of air and water.
(T.139).
Specifically, according to Dr. Tullis' testimony,
they rejected the commercial and
Highland.

(T.140).

indus~rial

development of

A master plan was adopted,.

(T.145),

followed by a zoning ordinance establishing residential and
agricultural, but no commercial or industrial classifications
(T. 146).

He testified that the surveys taken indicated

people in Highland didn't want any gravel extraction beyond
what already existed with the Ashrock operation extracting
about 200,000 tons a year (T.149).
J. Keith Hayes, representing the Hayes family,
which sold some of the territory in question to Gibbons
Realty Company, testified that no gravel had ever been extracted

(T.261), that he and his family had made an effort

to get out of the lawsuit

(T.252), and that they had made an

"overture" toward being released from the peitition

(T.257).

A proffer of testimony of Sidney Baucom, Vice President of Utah Power and Light co., was to the effect that the
8
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company had no particular policy relating to disconnection
matters, that he signed the papers as an accommodation to
Respondents' counsel, and that he did not know until shortly
prior to signing the papers whether the power company's
property was in the city, or in the county.

(T.224).

Virginia Mathis, a housewife and mother, testified
that there was already a steady stream of dump trucks going
past her house from the Ashrock operation, that the trucks
were extremely noisy, that they caused vibrations in.her house
to the point where objects fell off shelves, that dust was
a problem along with the noise, that the present operation
was disturbing to the extent of preventing conversation on
her

front~orch,

that the safety factor was such as to pre-

vent her children from playing with those across the street,
that the trucks had made it impossible the previous year to
sell her house, and that any additional gravel extraction
operation would "certainly affect our quality of life."
(T .120-125) .

Gordon Buckley Rose, the Utah County Planner, testified that if the territory in questionwere "deannexed, we
would have a great difficulty in providing services.

We

have intended for Highland town to provide these services."
(T.196).

Lee R. Fox, a deputy sheriff, testified about the
peculiar types of criminal activity that he had observed in
9
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the area in question, including beer parties and nude
swimming (T. 203-206).
Robert Palmquist, Mayor of North Salt Lake,
testified about a large gravel pit located in that city (T. 263).
Respondents' attorney objected to the evidence.

A proffer

was given by Appellant's attorney to the effect that, from
Mayor Palmquist's own experiences, a gravel operation has an
impact on an immediately adjacent town and that it is much
better to retain gravel operations within the town than to have
them outside and not subject to the town's control.

The Court

sustained an objection to this evidence (T. 265).
In addition, the Respondents' own witness, Emery
Carter, Executive Vice President of Gibbons and Reed Company,
testified on cross examination by Appellant's attorney that
in a busy year the company might extract as much as one hundred
sixty thousand tons of sand and gravel, and that

11

you would

probably have about on·e truck every twelve minutes if you are
working about 40 weeks a year, eight hours a day, five days a
week.

11

(T. 249).

Alpine City, Pleasant Grove City, and Lindon City
intervened in the case and Don Christiansen, Mayor of Alpine
City, testified that a gravel extraction operation on the
property sought to be disconnected would have an adverse
effect on the area near the mouth of American Fork Canyon
(T. 157), that he was concerned about dust that might come

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from the operc1.tion into Alpine City (T. 159) , that it would
create a traffic hazard on Highway 92 (T. 162), and that
there would be an advantage for the property in question
remaining under Highland City's control.

(T. 167).

But the foregoing evidence was almost wholly disregarded by the Court.
28, 1980,

Indeed, in his "Decision" dated August

(R. 125), the trial judge (page 4) wrote:
Much of the evidence presented by the respondents, other than that pertaining to
municipal services, the Court considers to
be irrelevant to a determination as to
whether disconnection should be allowed
in this case. The Court is mindful of
the strong feelings that the inhabitants
of Highland have about the possibility
of additional sand and gravel operations
along the east bench area of the community.
The Court construed the statute relative
to the evidence it must hear as being that
which any interested party would deem
relevant." The only excluded testimony
related to that tendered by the Mayor of
North Salt Lake concerning experiences
with Gibbons and Reed and its impact on
that community. The Court excluded the
testimony because it concluded the witness
had no 'interest' because of a geographic
remoteness to the area in question. However, all of the other testimony not relating to 'municipal services' the Court
has heard but at this time must rule that
it is irrelevant and that the Court cannot
give it credence in effecting its Decision
as to whether the disconnection should be
allowed.
(R. 125).
11

11

While it is true that the court allowed most of
Appellant's witnesses to testify, it might just as well not
I

have heard them at all, since the Court proceeded to rule
11
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that nearly all of their testimony was "irrelevant" and
that "the Court cannot give it credence."

(R. 125).

Why, then, hear the witnesses at all?
The pertinent words of Section 10-2-501

(3), are

that any interested parties "may appear before the court and
contest the granting of the petition for disconnection by
presenting the evidence as they deem relevant. "
Certainly, the legislature must be deemed to have
had a serious purpose in writing this section.

It would have

been frivolous in the extreme if it had intended to open the
door to ever-1 interested party to come and say what he thinks
is relevant, but then,. in effect, tell him,

"but the court

really isn't going to pay any attention to what you say."
The language of the statute can not have been inadvertent.
It constitutes such a departure from the procedure ordinarily
utilized in the district courts of the state of Utah, that
it simply has to have been written with the intention of
greatly enlarging the areas which the Court can,

and, indeed,

must consider in disconnection cases.
In other words, if the Court, as it acknowledged,
(R. 125), is required to hear the testimony of such witnesses,
it must also pay careful attention to the testimony, and give
it equally serious consideration in arriving at its decision
on the question of disconnection.

An.y other interpretation of

the statute is illogical.

12
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It will be argued by Respondents that the evidence
that the Court can consider in making its decision is limited
to the specific criteria recited in Sec. 10-2-503.

This

plainly is not so.
The legislature in writing Sec. 10-2-503, obviously
intended that the Court should take many other matters into
consideration.

If not, that statute never would have used

the clear and obvious language "the Court shall consider among
other factors ...... "
The words , "among other factors

11

,

are so unusual

and significant in this context that it is.obvious that they
were used, advisedly for the purpose of opening up a broad
spectrum of matters that must be considered and weighed by
the Court in arriving at a decision on disconnection.
I

The conclusion that the evidence deemed
in the Court's decision,

11

irrelevant"

should, indeed, be given equal weight

to other testimony, becomes inescapable when Sections 10-2-501
(3) and 10-2-503 are read together.
The language of the two Sections, complimenting,
and reinforcing each other as they do, and covering the same
subject matter, could not have been written by chance.

The

provisions clearly have the same goal--to open up trials of
disconnection cases to full and fair consideration of all
matters in order that small groups of land owners, for whatever their reasons, not be allowed to flout the will of the

13
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rest of the residents, however many there be, and
arbitrarily pull their property out of the city limits.
In Respondents' reply memorandum (R. 85) they
attempt to avail themselves of the rule of "ejusdem generis,

11

in trying to restrict the meaning of "other factors" to the
same kind of things thereafter set out in the statute, i.e.,
municipal services, and peninsular masses.
In doing so, they completely disregard and, in fact,
cripple, the clear meaning of the word

11

other.

11

"Other" in

this context cannot be interpreted to mean "similar" or the
"same."

It must be construed as

11

additional 11 or "different.

11

As stated in 67 C.J.S., pg. 908:
While it is referred to as a word of addition,
in its natural, usual, and normal use, it
indicates some thing or things in addition
to, differing from, or both additional to
and differing from, the antecedant thing
or things immediately in contemplation.
It has been said that the word "other" ordinarily means different from, different,
different in nature and kind, different
from that which has been specified, different
or distinct from the one or ones mentioned or
implied, different person or thing from the
one in view or under consideration just
specified, not the same.
It is important to note that the phrase used in the
statute is "among other factors,

11

not "such other factors

as."
The rule of ejusdem generis is but one of construction
and does not warrant a court in conforming the operation of a
14
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statute within narrower limits than intended by the legislature.

Willard vs. First security Bank of Idaho, Idaho,

206 P. 2d 770 (1949).
It should be noted that the general words "among other
factors" appear before the list of particular matters relied on
by Respondents.

The court, in Lyman vs. Bowmar, Colo., 533P.

2d 1129 (1975) said .that the ejusdern generis rule should be
used to construe general words in a statute only when the
general words follow, rather than precede, an enumeration of
particular classes of persons or things.
Certainly, Highland's government and its citizens,
should not be limited in their defense against_ the efforts of
Respondents merely because they were more imaginitive in presenting their case,

and that, in doing so, they raised many

issues that had not been brought up in previously reported
cases.
Some of the points raised by Appellant were thought to
be important by Justice Hansen in a dissenting opinion in
·rn Re consolidated Mining Co., et al, 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044
(1928), where he listed the following requirements for disconnection which are pertinent in this case, to wit:
Does the property sought to be excluded
from the city receive any direct and special
benefit from the exercise of the powers
granted to the city? Is it probable that
the future growth and expansion of the
city will require the territory sought
to be disconnected? Is the property
sought to be disconnected necessary for
15
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the use of the city?
71 Utah at 440, 266 P. at 1048.
Certainly, Appellant's witnesses effectively raised
the fact that the future growth and expansion of the city
requires the territory in question to remain within the city
limits, and the fact that it is necessary for the use of the
city.
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that the
court erred in refusing to take into consideration and
give "credence 11 to the evidence produced by Appell ant 's
witnesses at the trial.
POINT II
.THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JUSTICE
ANlJ EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE TERRITORY
BE DISCONNECTED.
Sec. 10-2-502 requires the Court, in a disconnection
proceeding, to find, not only that the petition was signed
by a majority of the registered voters of the territory
concerned and that the allegations of the petition are true,
but also that "justice and equity require the territory or any
part thereof to be disconnected from the municipality ..•..... "
For reasons set forth in Point I of Appellant's
Argument,

the Court is obligated to consider Appellant's

evidence as strongly as it does Respondents' in deciding
whether or not to disconnect the territory.
Certainly, the petition of disaffected property
owners should not be approved automatically, nor indeed, merely
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on the basis of such limited evidence as has been adduced
by Respondents.
The evidence Respondents are required to give in
a disconnection case must be stronger than they have provided
here.

To prevail, their evidence must also be stronger than

that of Appellant.
When Respondents' claim is measured against the
standard of Sec. 10-2-502,

"that justice and equity require"

the territory to be disconnected, it is even more obvious
that it is wanting.
If

11

justice

11

is to be given its proper interpretation,

the desire of the property owners to pull out of the city in
order to facilitate the creation and operation of a new
gravel and sand operation with all of its attendant evils
cannot be allowed to prevail over the fervent wishes of so
many residents of Highland City to maintain the quality of
life for which they fled to Highland City from their former
homes.

The same reasoning, of course, applies to the word

"equity•

II

The word
11

permit.

11

11

require

11

means much more than "allow" or

It means "imperative need'

1
,

Park vs Candler,

Ga. 40 S.E. 523 (1902); or "compel", Hiestand vs. Ristou,
Neb.,

284 N.W. 756 (1939); or "mandatory", Mississippi River

Fuel Corp. vs. Slayton, 339 F 2d 106 (8th Cir. 1966).
17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Certainly,

11

justice and equity" don 1 t

11

require"

disconnection of the territory when there are such important
and compelling "other factors" in evidence against it, as
Appellant has pointed out in its Statement of Facts, and
in Point I of its Argument.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT DISCONNECTION WOULD NOT CREATE ISLANDS
OR UNREASONABLY LARGE OR VARIED SHAPED
PENINSULAR LAND MASSES PROJECTING INTO
HIGHLAND CITY, AND FURTHER ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO
AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER OF DISCONNECTION IN VIEW
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AS TO THE
ANNEXATION OF THE KJAR PROPERTY.
Sec. 10-2-503, in delineating certain criteria which
the Court

11

shall "consider in deciding as to disconnection,

in.eludes the question of "whether or not the disconnection
will result in islands or unusually large or varied shaped
peninsular masses within or projecting into the boundaries
of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected.

11

Appellant doesn't quarrel with the fact that, at the
time of the evidentiary phase of the trial, disconnection of
the territory in question, because of its location at the
eastern edge of Highland City and its rather regular shape,
would not have produced the condition referred to in the
preceding paragraph.
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However, after the presentation of the evidence was
concluded, but before the Court ruled, Highland City completed
the annexation of what_was referred to at the trial as the
"Kjar property."
trial.

It was shown on the plat introduced at the

All the Exhibits introduced at the trial were later

misplaced and the Utah County Clerk was not able to locate
and certify them.

Consequently, the parties have stipulated

to the substitution of a map which has been filed with the
Court.
Upon learning about the annexation, Appellant's
attorney wrote a letter dated September 16, 1981, so advising
the Court.

(R. 144).

The Court completely disregarded the

annexation and proceeded to make its Findings, Conclusions,
and Order of Disconnection, as though it simply had not
occurred.

Thereupon, Appellant moved for a new trial, or at

least a modification by the Court, but this was denied.
The facts created by the annexation clearly contradict Finding number 7,

and Conclusion number l, to the effect

that no island or unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular land mass would be created by the disconnection.
The annexation would, in fact,

create a virtual island

out of the disconnected territory inasmuch as the Kjar property
lies to the east and is entirely separated from and outside
the rest of the city.

At the very least, the Kjar annexation,

coupled with the proposed disconnection, would create an
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unusually large peninsular land mass (the disconnected
property, itself) projecting into the city.
While Joseph A. Kjar did testify at the trial of
having talked with Mayor LeBaron about the possibility of
the annexation of his property (T. 188, 189) this was not an
accomplished fact at the time.

Thus, Appellant was in no

position to introduce evidence during the trial relating
to the effect that annexation might have had.
When the city did annex the Kjar property, this
created new,

compelling evidence not previously available.

The Utah Court, in a criminal case, State vs.
Weaver 78 Utah 555, 6 P. 2d 167 (1931), considered a
motion for a new trial based on Sec. 77-38-3 (7), Utah Code
Annotated

(1953), as amended, which is almost identical in

substance to Rule 59 (2)

(4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court said, at 6 P. 2d 169:
the Courts are not in accord respecting all
these requirements, but fakly agree that
the newly discovered evidence be such as
could not with reasonable diligence have
been discovered and produced at the trial,
that it not be merely cumulative, and that
it be such as to render a different result
probable on the retrial of the case.
Certainly the evidence created by the annexation of
the Kjar property met the above criteria in every respect,
and should have been taken into account by the court.
20
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The Judge,

at the time the annexation was called to

his attention, had not written Findings, Conclusions, or his
Order of Disconnection.

It was appropriate and proper therefore

that he should direct that further evidence of the foregoing
situation be presented by Appellant and Respondents along with
any legal arguments they may have had as to its effect in
light of Sec. 10-2-503.
The district courts are given wide discretion in Utah
as to whether or not to grant new trials on the basis of newly
discovered evidence.

See Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Utah 122,

247 P. 2d 264 (1952) where a new trial was granted.
Notwithstanding that latitude, however, it appears
that the court in this instance abused its discretion by paying absolutely no attention to the fact of the annexation
of the Kjar property, and that it, coupled with the disconnection of the 131 acres, clearly created a large peninsular land
mass extending into Highland City.
At the very least, the court should have granted
Appellant's motion for a new trial or at least amended the
Findings of Fact, Conclusionsof Law,and Order of Disconnection
to reflect the situation created by the Kjar annexation.
Authority for such an action by the Court is contained in Rule 59 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
authorizes the Court to "open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend Findings of Fact
21
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and Conclusions of Law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment.

11

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should
remand this case to the District Court with instructions to
consider all of the evidence presented by Appellant and
Intervenors, both during the trial and in connection with
Appellant's motion for a new trial in determining-whether
or not to allow disconnection of the territory, and to take
whatever further evidence may be necessary or helpful in
arriving at its decision.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellant
Highland Town, aka
Highland City, a Municipal
Corporation
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